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Dynamic Correlation Analysis of Financial Contagion:  
Evidence from Asian Markets  
 
 
 
 
1.  Introduction      
 
 During the period from July 1997 through early 1998, Asian financial markets 
experienced a series of financial distresses, which spread rapidly and sequentially from 
one country to another in a short interval of intense crises.   Later on, it spread further to 
Russia and Latin America.  The short-term damage of the crisis not only caused asset 
prices to plunge across these markets, but also created speculative runs and capital flight, 
leading to considerable financial instability for the entire region.  A longer-run 
consequence triggered by the crisis and its spillover effect was that it brought about a 
dramatic loss of confidence for investors who had intended to invest in Asian markets, 
jeopardizing the economic growth of the region.  Such a shift in the attitudes of investors 
may produce prolonged damage to portfolio investments because their concerns may not 
subside until another successful story of economic growth in the region develops, and 
that may take a long time.  As such, academic researchers and policy makers alike have 
paid close attention to identifying the channels of shock transmission across countries and 
to measuring the damaging impact of crises on the environment for investments in Asian 
markets.  
 Since the financial shocks and the contagion process in the Asian crisis episode were 
attributable to a variety of factors beyond economic linkages, many researchers have 
focused on financial contagion by providing evidence of significant increases in cross-
country correlations of stock returns and/or volatility in the region (Sachs, et al., 1996). 
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Yet, the existence of contagion in relation to the crisis remains a debatable issue.  Some 
studies show a significant increase in correlation coefficients during the Asian crisis and 
conclude that there was a contagion effect (Baig and Goldfajn, 1999). Other researchers 
find that after accounting for heteroskedasticity, there is no significant increase in 
correlation between asset returns in pairs of crisis-hit countries, reaching the conclusion 
that there was “no contagion, only interdependence” (Forbes and Rigobon, 2002; Bordo 
and Murshid, 2001; Basu, 2002).1  However, in their tests for financial contagion based 
on a single-factor model, Corsetti et al. (2005) find “some contagion, some 
interdependence.”  Further, focusing on different transmission channels, Froot et al. 
(2001) and Basu (2002) confirm the existence of the contagion effect. 2    Thus, the 
evidence on the financial contagion is not conclusive.  
 The existing literature on the empirical research of financial contagion has several 
limitations and drawbacks.  First, there is a heteroskedasticity problem when measuring 
correlations, caused by volatility increases during the crisis.  Second, in addition to a lagged 
dependent variable, an omitted variable problem arises in the estimation of cross-country 
correlation coefficients due to the lack of availability of consistent and compatible financial 
                                                 
 
1  Forbes and Rigobon (2002) define contagion as significant increases in cross-market co-movement. Any 
continued high level of market correlation suggests strong linkages between the two economies and is 
defined as interdependence. Following this line of argument, contagion must involve a dynamic 
increment in correlation.   
2  Pritsker (2001) summarizes four types of transmission channels: the correlated information channel (von 
Furstenberg and Jeon, 1989; King and Wadhwani, 1990) or the wake-up call hypothesis (Sachs et al., 
1996), liquidity channel (Forbes, 2004; Claessens et al., 2001), the cross-market hedging channel 
(Kodres and Pritsker, 2002; Calvo and Mendoza, 2000), and the wealth effect channel (Kyle and Xiong, 
2001). Although a direct test for identifying specific transmission channels of financial contagion may be 
more fruitful, it is not an easy task to implement due to the lack of microstructure data for investors or 
without a priori identification of the relevant fundamental variables. Thus, many of the empirical  research 
papers on the analysis of contagion effects turn to the investigation of asset-return co-movements, applying 
various forms of correlation analyses. Along this line, contagion is defined as a significant increase in 
correlation between asset returns in different markets 
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data in Asian markets. Third, since contagion is defined as significant increases in cross-
market co-movements, while any continued market correlation at high levels is 
considered to be interdependence (Forbes and Rigobon, 2002), the existence of contagion 
must involve evidence of a dynamic increment in correlations.  Thus, the dynamic nature 
of the correlation needs to be sorted out.  Fourth, a common problem encountered by these 
studies is the fact that virtually all of the tests are affected by identifying the source of crisis 
and the choice of window length (Billio and Pelizzon, 2003).  Moreover, the choice of sub-
samples conditioning on high and low volatility is both arbitrary and subject to a selection 
bias (Boyer et al., 1999).3  Fifth, it is generally recognized that indicators of sovereign 
creditworthiness represented by sovereign credit ratings announced by international 
credit rating agencies and publications are based on economic fundamentals; the changes 
in ratings are perceived to reflect an external assessment of the risk associated with 
changes in economic fundamentals or political risk, which should have an impact on  
stock returns and, in turn, the correlation coefficients (Beers, et al., 2002; Kaminsky and 
Schmukler, 2002). 4   Sovereign rating downgrades in one country may create an 
international contagion effect through the wake-up call to neighboring countries that have 
similar macroeconomic environments and the cross-market hedging channels.  Baig and 
Goldfajn (1999) find an increase in the correlations in the sovereign spread during the 
                                                 
3 Fong (2003) uses a bivariate regime-switching model by pairing the U.S. stock market with four other 
major stock markets and allowing for correlations to switch endogenously as a function of volatility 
jumps of a particular country. The extent of correlation jumps is generally small and statistically 
significant only for Canada. However, Fong’s finding (2003)   also admits that the model shares the same 
limitation as models in the previous literature in that it assumes one country (the United States) to be the 
only source of volatility shocks. 
4  Beers, et al. (2002) note that “Standard & Poor’s sovereign credit ratings are an assessment of each    
 government’s ability and willingness to service its debt in full and on time.”  The appraisal of each 
 sovereign’s overall creditworthiness is based on a number of measures of economic and financial 
 performance.  The information includes political risk, income and economic structure, economic growth 
 prospects, fiscal stability, monetary stability, offshore and contingent liabilities, external liquidity, and 
 various debt burdens. 
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crisis periods as compared to tranquil periods.  Their analysis, however, lacks dynamic 
elements and fails to provide a systematic framework to capture the invention from credit 
rating changes.  
To overcome the limitations found in the existing literature, this paper employs a 
cross-country, multivariate GARCH model, which is appropriate for measuring time-
varying conditional correlations. This methodology will enable us to address the 
heteroskedasticity problem raised by Forbes and Rigobon (2002) without arbitrarily 
dividing the sample into two sub-periods.5  In the meantime, using lagged U.S. stock 
returns as an exogenous factor and estimating the system simultaneously help us to resolve 
the omitted variable problem and, at the same time, to account for the global common 
factor. 6   More important, the model provides a mechanism to trace the time-varying 
correlation coefficients for a group of Asian stock markets.  Analyzing the derived time 
series of correlation coefficients allows us to detect dynamic investor behavior in 
response to news and innovations.  Particularly, our empirical analysis provides new 
evidence of the significant impact of sovereign credit rating changes around the 
announcement dates, domestic and foreign, on cross-country correlation coefficients of 
stock returns in the Asian countries. This new insight will be informative for global 
investors, helping them to make better decisions with regard to asset and risk 
management, including asset allocation, portfolio diversification, and hedging strategy 
(Fong, 2003).   
                                                 
5  The GARCH model featuring  constant conditional correlations can be found in the paper of Longin and 
Solnik (1995).  It can also be used to identify factors that affect conditional correlation, but it can deal 
with only one factor at a time, creating too many parameters. 
6  For instance, in the F-R study, Hong Kong is assumed to be the source of contagion.  This treatment fails to 
take into account the fact that during the crisis period, adverse news in each crisis country could trigger 
financial market turbulence in any other neighboring country.  The model thus suffers from a simultaneous-
equation bias.   
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 The major findings of this paper are summarized as follows.  First, this study, which 
uses a longer data span, finds supportive evidence of contagion during the Asian-crisis 
period, resolving the puzzle of “no contagion, only interdependence” reported by Forbes 
and Rigobon (2002).  Second, two different phases of the Asian crisis are identified.  The 
first phase, from the start of the crisis to November 17, 1997, entails a process of 
increasing volatility in  stock returns due to contagion spreading from the earlier crisis-hit 
countries to other countries.  In this phase, investor trading activities are governed mainly 
by local (country) information.  However, in the second phase, from the end of 1997 
through 1998, as the crisis grew in public awareness, the correlations between stock 
returns and their volatility are consistently higher, as evidenced by herding behavior. 
Statistical analysis of correlation coefficients shows shifts in the level as well as in the 
variance of correlations, casting some doubt on the benefit of international portfolio 
diversification during the crises.  Third, after controlling for the variables involved in the 
crisis period, we find that the correlation coefficients respond sensitively to changes in 
sovereign credit ratings. This indicates that both market participants and financial credit-
rating agents have their own dynamic roles in shaping correlation coefficients.  
 The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data and 
statistics of stock returns. Section 3 examines the correlation coefficients based on a 
simple correlation analysis by adjusting the impact of volatility during different sample 
periods.  Section 4 presents a multivariate GARCH model and discusses its application to 
our context.  Section 5 reports the estimation results and tests the time-varying correlation 
coefficients in response to different shocks.  Section 6 contains conclusions. 
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2.  Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 The data used in this study are daily stock-price indices from January 1, 1990, 
through March 21, 2003, for eight Asian countries that were seriously affected by the 
1997 Asian financial crisis.  The data set consists of the stock indices of Thailand 
(Bangkok S.E.T. Index), Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur SE Index), Indonesia (Jakarta SE 
Composite Index), the Philippines (Philippines SE Composite Index), South Korea 
(Korea SE Composite), Taiwan (Taiwan SE Weighted Index), Hong Kong (Hang Seng 
Index), and Singapore (Singapore Straits Times Index). In addition, two stock indices 
from industrial countries, Japan (Nikkei 225 Stock Average Index) and the United States 
(S&P 500 Composite Index), are included. All the national stock price indices are in local 
currency, dividend-unadjusted, and based on daily closing prices in each national market. 
Japan was affected by the Asian crisis, but at a much later stage and to a lesser extent.  
The inclusion of the United States is due mainly to the fact that the U.S. market serves as 
a global factor in the region.  All the data were obtained from Datastream International.  
 Following the conventional approach, stock returns are calculated as the first difference 
of the natural log of each stock-price index, and the returns are expressed as percentages.7  
                                                 
7  Stock-market returns in Forbes and Rigobon (2002) are calculated as rolling-average, two-day returns on 
each country’s stock index to control for the fact that markets in different countries are not open during 
the same hours.  In terms of  Hong Kong (HK) time, opening and closing times for each market are:  
Country  HK  JP  KO   IN  PH TH SG MA TW 
Open (am) 10:00 8:00 8:00 10:30 9:30 10:55 9:00 9:00 9:00 
Close (pm) 16:00 14:00 14:00 17:00 12:00 18:00 17:00 17:00 13:30 
Some of these markets have breaks at noon.  In this paper, we do not use rolling-average, two-day returns, 
since no difference was found in their sensitivity tests using different ways to calculate stock returns (see 
Table V in FR’s paper, 2002).  Moreover, using two-day returns tends to generate serial correlation, and 
this type of measurement is not compatible for use in examining the announcement effect, which is 
defined as being on a daily basis.  Our analysis (not reported) also finds no significant difference  using 
daily vs. two-day returns.  The results are available upon request.  
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When data were unavailable, because of national holidays, bank holidays, or any other 
reasons, stock prices were assumed to stay the same as those of the previous trading day. 
 The summary statistics of stock-index returns in the eight Asian countries, Japan, and 
the United States are presented in Table 1.  As noted by various media reports, the Thai 
government gave up defending the value of its currency, the baht, on July 2, 1997, which 
triggered a significant depreciation of the currencies of Thailand and its neighboring 
Asian nations. Therefore, we use this date to break the entire sample into two sub-periods: 
pre-crisis and post-crisis periods. When the first two moments for the two sub-periods are 
compared, stock returns are generally higher during the pre-crisis period, while variances 
are higher during the post-crisis period. Another noteworthy statistic of the stock-return 
series shown in Table 1 is a high value of kurtosis.  This suggests that, for these markets, 
big shocks of either sign are more likely to be present and that the stock-return series may 
not be normally distributed. Almost all of the stock-return series are found to have first-
order autocorrelation for the daily data.  The existence of this autocorrelation may result 
from nonsynchronous trading of the stocks that make up the index.  It could also be due 
to price limitations imposed on the index or other types of market friction, producing a 
partial adjustment process.   
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 To visualize the returns for each market, we depict the series in Figure 1.  With the 
exceptions of Taiwan and Japan, the plots show a clustering of larger return volatility 
around and after mid 1997.  This market phenomenon has been widely recognized and 
successfully captured by GARCH types of models in the finance literature (Bollerslev  et 
al., 1992). 
 8
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
3.  Correlation Analyses  
 Since correlation analysis has been widely used to measure the degree of financial 
contagion, it is convenient to start our investigation by checking the simple pair-wise 
correlation between the stock returns for the countries under investigation. However, 
correlation coefficients across countries are likely to increase during a highly volatile 
period. That is, if a crisis hits Country A with increasing volatility in its stock market, it 
will be transmitted to Country B with a rise in volatility and, in turn, the correlation of 
stock returns in both Country A and Country B.   
 To address the issue of heteroskedasticity, we calculate the heteroskedasticity-
adjusted correlation coefficients proposed by Forbes and Rigobon (2002; F-R hereafter).8   
We then use the standard Z-test for statistical inference.9 A potential problem with this 
analysis is that the source of contagion has to be identified beforehand.  For the 
                                                 
8  F-R propose an adjusted correlation coefficient, *ρ , as:
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convenience of comparison with research in the literature, both Thailand (with a 
breakpoint of July 2, 1997) and Hong Kong (with a breakpoint of October 17, 1997), 
respectively, are considered as the source of contagion in this study. 10   
 The results are reported in Table 2A.  In both cases, although the contagion effects 
(based on correlation coefficients having adjusted for heteroskedasticity) are not as 
significant as those being calculated without adjusting for heteroskedasticity, some 
evidence shows that correlation coefficients increase significantly after the crisis occurs, 
producing somehow different results from those reported in F-R’s study.  As will be 
shown at a later point, the main difference is due to the different data length used in 
estimating the turmoil period.11  
[Insert Table 2A about here] 
 This new evidence also raises a question about whether the source country of contagion 
matters. To address this question, we recalculated the adjusted correlation coefficients 
based on the order in which infected countries were impacted during the crisis.12  It follows 
that 31 pair-wise correlation coefficients are calculated and tested.13  The results show that, 
before correction, the null hypothesis of no correlation increase is rejected by 29 out of 31 
coefficients, which is consistent with F-R’s finding.  As shown in Table 2B, after the 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
10 F-R argue that during the Asian crisis, the events in Asia became headline news in the world only after 
the Hong Kong market declined sharply in October 1997. Therefore, they use Hong Kong as the only 
source of contagion and October 17, 1997, as the breakpoint of the whole sample period.  
11 A comparison with  FR’s result will be given in the discussion of Figure 3 and footnote 28. 
12 The order of these countries is Thailand (managed float of the baht on July 2, 1997), the Philippines (wider 
float of the peso on July 11, 1997), Malaysia (float of the ringit on July 14, 1997), Indonesia (float of the 
rupiah on August 14, 1997), Singapore (large decline in stock  and currency markets on August 28, 1997), 
Taiwan (large decline in stock and currency markets on October 17, 1997), Hong Kong (large decline in 
stock market on October 17, 1997), Korea (float of won on November 17, 1997), and Japan (stock-market 
crash on December 19, 1997). Their respective breakpoints are also used, with similar results.  
13 There are (1+8)*8/2=36 pair-wise correlations with five correlation decreases in the case of Malaysia. 
 10
relative volatility is corrected, though, the contagion effect is moderate; yet we still find 
that the null hypothesis is rejected at the 10 percent level in 16 out of 31 cases.  
[Insert Table 2B about here] 
 The simple-correlation analysis with correction for heteroskedasticity highlights the 
significance of market volatility in a given window.  However, market behavior is expected 
to change continuously in response to ongoing shocks.   In the next section, we discuss this 
issue further by employing a multivariate GARCH model to capture the information of the 
time-varying characteristics of the correlation matrix. 
 
4. The Dynamic Correlation Coefficient Model 
The multivariate GARCH model proposed by Engle (2002), which is used to estimate 
dynamic conditional  correlations  (DCC) in this paper, has three  advantages  over  other  
estimation methods.14  First, the DCC-GARCH model estimates correlation coefficients of 
the standardized residuals and thus accounts for heteroskedasticity directly.  Second, the 
model allows us to include additional explanatory variables in the mean equation to ensure 
that the model is well specified.  In this connection, we include U.S. stock returns as an 
exogenous global factor, rather than using the source of contagion (e.g., stock returns in 
Thailand) as an independent variable.  Third, the multivariate GARCH model can be used 
to examine multiple asset returns without adding too many parameters. 15   The 
parsimonious parameter setting permits us to deal with up to 45 pair-wise correlation 
                                                 
14 Another type of multivariate GARCH model with constant conditional correlation (CCC) is also used to 
estimate the correlation coefficients by splitting the sample period into two, using July 2, 1997, as the 
breakpoint.  The results are very similar to those in unconditional correlation analysis. In 34 pair-wise 
correlation increases, 30 are significant before correction for heteroskedasticity and 20 are still 
significant after the correction. 
15 Other types of multivariate GARCH models, such as the full vec model and the BEKK model (Engle and 
Kroner, 1995) would become costly in estimation time if expanded to three asset returns. 
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coefficient series in a single representation. The resulting estimates of time-varying 
correlation coefficients provide us with dynamic trajectories of correlation behavior for 
national stock-index returns in a multivariate setting. This information enables us to 
analyze the correlation behavior when there are multiple regime shifts in response to 
shocks, crises, and credit-rating changes.   
To start with, we specify the return equation as: 
 ,  (1) t
US
ttt rrr εγγγ +++= −− 12110
where , N=10; )',,,( ,,2,1 tNttt rrrr L= )',,,( ,,2,1 tNtttε εεε L= ; and ~| 1−ℑttε N . ),0( tH
Following the conventional approach, an AR(1) term and the one-day lagged U.S. stock 
return are included in the mean equation.  The AR(1) is used to account for the 
autocorrelation of stock returns, which was found in almost all the countries under 
investigation, as reported in Table 1.  The lagged U.S. stock returns have often been used 
to account for a global factor (Dungey, et al., 2003).16  The inclusion of the lagged U.S. 
stock returns is also based on the empirical finding that U.S. stock returns play an 
important role in determining stock returns in Asian countries and that Asian stock 
returns have no significant dynamic effect on U.S. stock return.  Next, we specify a 
multivariate conditional variance as: 
 , (2) tttt DRDH =
                                                 
16 At this stage, we include neither exchange-rate changes nor interest-rate changes in the mean equations. 
During the crisis, exchange rates change discretely. Our study (not reported), which is consistent with the 
finding reported by Kallberg et al. (2005), indicates that exchange-rate changes can explain only a very 
small portion of stock-market changes during the crisis.  In addition, the interest-rate data for these Asian 
countries do not have a consistent measurement and fail to reflect free market operation due to government 
intervention, which makes it inappropriate to include interest-rate changes in this study, which uses daily 
data.  As Baig and Goldfajn (1999) argue, overnight call rates were widely used as tools of monetary policy 
so that they reflect more about the policy stance than about the market-determined levels.  
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where  is the (NxN) diagonal matrix of time-varying standard deviations from 
univariate GARCH models with 
tD
tiih , on the i
th diagonal, and  is the (NxN) time-
varying correlation matrix. The DCC model proposed by Engle (2002) involves two-
stage estimation of the conditional covariance matrix Ht.  In the first stage, univariate 
volatility models are fitted for each of stock return and estimates of 
tR
tiih , are obtained.  
In the second stage, stock return residuals are transformed by their estimated standard 
deviations from the first stage.  That is, tiititi hu ,,, /ε= ,  where  is then used  to 
estimate the parameters of the conditional correlation.  The evolution of the correlation in 
the DCC model is given by:  
ti,u
 , )1( 1
'
11 −−− ++−−= tttt QuuQQ βαβα  (3) 
where Q =E[  is the NxN unconditional variance matrix of ut, and]'ttuu βα  and are 
nonnegative scalar parameters satisfying .1)  ( <+ βα  Since Qt does not generally have 
ones on the diagonal, we scale it to obtain a proper correlation matrix  Thus,  .tR
 = Qt . (4) tR )( 
2/1
,
2/1
,11
−− ⋅⋅⋅ tNNt qqdiag )( 2/1 ,2/1,11 −− ⋅⋅⋅ tNNt qqdiag
Now in equation (4) is a correlation matrix with ones on the diagonal and off-diagonal 
elements less than one in absolute value, as long as Qt is positive definite. 
tR
17  A typical 
element is of the form:  
                                                 
17 Tse and Tsui (2002) present a different form of DCC model by using = (1-tR 11) −− +Ψ+− tt RR βαβα , 
where R is symmetric NxN positive definite parameter matrix with iiρ =1, 1−Ψt  is the NxN correlation 
matrix of error term.  Its  i.j-th element is given by: .
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tjjtiitijtij qqq ,,,, /=ρ  ,   i, j = 1, 2, …, N and i ≠ j. (5) 
Expressing the correlation coefficient in a bivariate case, we have: 
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 As proposed by Engle (2002), the DCC model can be estimated by using a two-stage 
approach to maximizing the log-likelihood function as:  
L )] ||log(
2
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− εεπ .(7) 
The first part of the likelihood function in Equation (7) is volatility, which is the sum of 
individual GARCH likelihoods.  The log-likelihood function can be maximized in the 
first stage over the parameters in .  Given the estimated parameters in the first stage, 
the correlation component of the likelihood function in the second stage (the second part 
of Equation (7)) can be maximized to estimate correlation coefficients.  
tD
 
5. Evidence from Dynamic Correlations for the Hardest-Hit Country Group 
5.1 Estimates of the Model 
 Table 3 reports the estimates of the return and conditional variance equations.  The 
AR(1) term in the mean equation is significantly positive for Thailand, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Philippines, and Singapore, while it is significantly negative for Hong Kong 
and Japan. This finding is in agreement with the evidence in the literature in that the 
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AR(1) is positive in emerging markets due to price friction or partial adjustment and that 
AR(1) is negative as the presence of positive feedback trading in advanced markets 
(Antoniou et al., 2005).   However, AR(1) is not significant for Korea, Taiwan, and the 
United States.  Consistent with most studies on Asian markets (Dungey et al., 2003), the 
effect of U.S. stock returns on Asian stock returns is, on average, highly significant and 
consistently large in magnitude, ranging from 0.155 (Indonesia) to 0.474 (Hong Kong). 
The coefficients for the lagged variance and shock-squared terms in the variance equation 
are highly significant, which is consistent with time-varying volatility and justifies the 
appropriateness of the GARCH (1,1) specification.  Note that the sum of the estimated 
coefficients (see last column) in the variance equation, (a + b), is close to unity for all of 
the cases, implying that the volatility displays a highly persistent fashion.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 An advantage of using this model, as it stands, is the fact that all possible pair-wise 
correlation coefficients (45) for the 10 countries in the sample can be estimated in a 
single-system equation. 18  To simplify the presentation and reduce unnecessary 
parameterizations in calculation, we examine the dynamic patterns of correlation changes 
by focusing on the hardest-hit countries, including Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Korea, and Hong Kong.19  
5.2  Two Phases of the Crisis    
                                                 
18 The contemporary correlation coefficients between U.S. stock returns and  Asian stock returns may have 
less practical meaning due to time zone differences.  The Asian stock returns in day t are expected to be 
the most affected by U.S. stock returns in day t-1. 
19 Hong Kong is added to the analysis because of its significance in relation to Asian markets and it is 
 convenient for comparing our result with the literature in a similar setting (Forbes and Rigobon, 2002). 
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 Figure 2 shows pair-wise conditional correlation coefficients between the stock 
returns of Thailand and those of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Korea, and Hong 
Kong during the period 1996-2003.20  These time-series patterns show that the pair-wise 
conditional correlations increased during the second half of 1997 and reached their 
highest level in 1998.  Although all six countries were hit hard, the stock returns of 
Thailand  during  the  early  stages of  the crisis showed very low correlations (as low as  
–0.055) with the stock returns of the other five countries.21  However, throughout 1998, 
the correlations became significantly higher and persisted at the higher levels, ranging 
from 0.3 to 0.47, before declining at the end of 1998.22    
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
 Consistent with the observations made by Bae et al. (2003) and Kallberg et al. (2005), 
our study provides evidence of contagion effects in these Asian stock markets in the early 
phases of the crisis and then a transition to herding behavior in the latter phases.  Here 
contagion and herding behavior are distinguished in the sense that contagion describes 
the spread of shocks from one market to another with a significant increase in correlation 
between markets, while herding describes the simultaneous behavior of investors across 
                                                 
20 We also produce a figure for the time-varying correlation coefficients, starting from 1990, to capture 
some events associated with the shocks during the early 1990s (not shown).  The information shows that 
during the Gulf War in 1990 and 1991, the correlations increased almost 200 percent.  During 1994 and 
1995, the correlation coefficients also increased substantially, which might be due to the crisis in Mexico.  
However, none of these events were shown to be as significant as the Asian crisis. 
21 It should be noted that the low correlation in mid 1997 is not evidence against the contagion effect.  Our 
explanation will be provided at a later point.  
22 Most of the correlation coefficients started to decline around October 20, 1998. A similar model is run 
for the exchange-rate changes in these countries. However, relative to the stock markets, the currency 
markets had less activity and the estimated pair-wise correlation coefficients could not explain all of the 
correlation changes in the stock markets.  The evidence is consistent with results reported by Kallberg et al. 
(2005). One possible explanation is that the currency markets received more government intervention, 
setting a fixed parity relation with the U.S. dollar.     
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different markets with high correlation coefficients in all markets.23  Our interpretation is 
that in the early phases of the crisis, investors focus mainly on local country information, 
so that contagion takes place.  As the crisis becomes public news, investor decisions tend 
to converge due to herding behavior, creating higher correlations.  Specifically, when 
Thailand depreciated its currency, investors were focusing on asset management in 
Thailand’s market, paying very little attention to other countries’ markets.   As investors 
began to withdraw their funds from Thailand and reinvest in other countries in the region, 
this action resulted in decreased correlations at the beginning of the crisis.  As more and 
more asset prices declined in neighboring countries due to the contagion effect spreading 
through various channels, investors began to panic and withdraw funds from all of the 
Asian economies.24  During this process, the convergence of market consensus and the 
stock returns in these economies showed a gradual increase in correlation. This 
phenomenon is identified as the first phase of the crisis.  
 Given the increasing uncertainty in the markets, the cost of collecting credible 
information is relatively high during such a period, and investors are likely to follow 
major investors in making their own investing decisions.  Any public news about one 
country may be interpreted as information regarding the entire region.  That is why we 
see consistently high correlations in 1998; this phenomenon is a result of herding 
                                                 
23  As noted by Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003), herding/dispersing is defined to include any behavioral 
similarity/dissimilarity brought about by actual interactions of individuals. Herding is a phenomenon of 
convergence in response to sudden shifts of investor sentiment or due to cross-market hedging. It should 
be mentioned that observation of others can lead to dispersing instead of herding if preferences are 
opposing.  
24 Kaminsky et al. (2000) indicate that bond and equity flows to Asia collapsed from their peak of US$38 
billion in 1996 to US$9 billion in 1998. In particular Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Korea 
experienced, respectively, 12.91 percent, 11.75 percent, 6.91 percent, and 6.49 percent average net 
selling (as a percentage of the holdings at the end of the preceding quarter) in the first two quarters 
following the outbreak of the crisis.   
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behavior and identified as the second phase. As observed, the second phase started when 
South Korea was impacted and floated its currency, the won, on November 17, 1997. 
Thereafter, news in any country would affect other countries, representing the period of 
the most widespread panic.25  
5. 3 Statistical Analysis of Correlation Coefficients in Different Phases of the Crisis 
 As shown in Figure 2, the pair-wise conditional-correlation coefficients between 
stock returns of these Asian countries were seen to be persistently higher and more 
volatile in the second phase of the crisis.  This leads to two important implications from 
the investor’s perspective.  First, a higher level of correlation implies that the benefit 
from market-portfolio diversification diminishes, since holding a portfolio with diverse 
country stocks is subject to systematic risk.  Second, a higher volatility of the correlation 
coefficients suggests that the stability of the correlation is less reliable, casting some 
doubts on using the estimated correlation coefficient in guiding portfolio decisions.  For 
these reasons, we need to look into the time-series behavior of correlation coefficients 
and sort out the impacts of external shocks on their movements and variability. 
Using three dummy variables for different sub-samples allows us to investigate the 
dynamic feature of the correlation changes associated with different phases of crises.  The 
regression model is given by: 
tij
k
tkk
P
p
ptijptij eDM ,
3
1
,
1
,,  ∑∑
==
− ++= αρφρ  (8) 
where  tij ,ρ  is the pair-wise correlation coefficient between the stock returns of  Thailand  
and  the  other crisis countries of Indonesia, Malaysia, Hong Kong, Korea, and the 
                                                 
25 Applying the threshold-cointegration model to daily exchange rates, both spot and forward, Jeon and Seo 
(2003) identify the exact breakpoint as November 18, 1997, for the Korean won, and August 15, 1997, 
for the Thai baht.  
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Philippines, such that ;Thailand=i =j  Indonesia, Malaysia, Hong Kong, Korea, and the 
Philippines. The lag length in equation (8) is determined by the AIC criterion.  is a 
dummy variable for the first phase of the crisis period (7/2/1997-11/17/1997); is a 
dummy variable for the second phase of the Asian crisis (11/18/1997-12/31/1998); 
 is the dummy variable for the post-crisis period (1/1/1999-3/21/2003).  Since our 
pre-tests using ARCH-LM statistics find significant heteroskedasticity in all cases,
tDM ,1
tDM ,2
tDM ,3
tijh ,
26 three 
dummy variables, DMk,t (k =1,2,3), are added to a GARCH(1,1) specification.  The 
conditional variance equation is given by  
tkktij DMhAA ,,10 += −
k
d
3
1
∑
=tij
B 2 1,11 ++ −ε  (9) 
As the model implies, the significance of the estimated coefficients on the dummy 
variables indicates structural changes in mean or/and variance shifts of the correlation 
coefficients due to external shocks during the different phases of the crisis. 
 The estimates using the maximum-likelihood method for the GARCH (1,1) model are 
reported in Table 4.  The evidence shows that none of the  in the mean equation is 
statistically significant, indicating that the correlation during the early phase of the crisis 
is not significantly different from that of the pre-crisis period.  This may reveal the fact 
that there was a drop in the correlation coefficients at the beginning of the crisis because 
the news may be considered as a single-country case and the crisis signal has not been 
fully recognized.  
tDM ,1
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
                                                 
26 LM tests for Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Korea using ARCH(4) are 34.26, 421.51, 181.27, and 
127.06, respectively.  The absence of an ARCH effect is rejected uniformly.   
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 However, as time passes and investors gradually learn the negative news affecting 
market development, they start to follow the crowds, i.e, they begin to imitate more 
reputable and sophisticated investors.  As the threat of investment losses becomes more 
widespread, the dispersed market behavior gradually converges as information 
accumulates, leading to more uniform behavior and producing a higher correlation.  At 
the moment when any public news about one country is interpreted as information for the 
entire region, the correlation becomes more significant.  This is seen in the second phase 
of the crisis, as reflected by a significant rise in all the coefficients on in the mean 
equation.  This finding is consistent with the comovement paths shown in Figure 2 and 
supports the herding behavior hypothesis in the second phase of the crisis. Obviously, the 
herding phenomenon will negate the benefit of holding a diversified international 
portfolio in the region.   
tDM ,2
 In the post-crisis period, the correlation coefficients, as shown in the estimates of 
, decreased significantly in all cases except Korea and Hong Kong, where the stock 
markets might still have been experiencing some hangover effect. For the rest of the 
markets, as expected, investors became more rational in analyzing the fundamentals of 
the individual markets rather than herding after others.  Thus, the correlations between 
market returns declined.  The high correlation between the stock returns of Thailand and 
Korea as well as between Thailand and Hong Kong after the crisis is consistent with the 
wake-up call hypothesis, where investors realized that there was some similarity between 
tDM ,3
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the two markets’ fundamentals after the crisis.  Therefore, their trading strategy was 
based on related information from both markets.27 
 As most asset-return models reported, all of the estimates of the lagged variance and 
shock-squared terms are highly significant, displaying a clustering phenomenon.  
Moreover, the evidence shows that the correlation coefficients between two markets 
profoundly changed after the occurrence of the Asian crisis.  As shown in the lower part 
of Table 4, the coefficients on DM1,t and DM2,t are positive and highly significant, 
indicating more volatile changes in the correlation coefficients in the first and second 
phases of the crisis; the explosive changes in volatility even extended into the post-crisis 
period as indicated by the significance of the coefficients on DM3,t.  The evidence thus 
suggests that when the crisis hits the market, the correlation coefficients could vary 
greatly, and this variability could be prolonged for a significant period of time.  As a 
result, the estimates and statistical inference of risk from risk models based on constant 
correlation coefficients can be very misleading.  
 It is of interest to compare this model with the model presented by Forbes and 
Rigobon (2002).  To elucidate, we depict both the dynamic Thailand-HK correlation 
coefficient series (reproduced from Figure 2) and the constant correlation coefficient 
series in Figure 3.  The solid line shows the time-varying correlation derived from the 
DCC-GARCH model for the period from January 1 , 1996, to December 31, 1998. The 
                                                 
27 Estimations are also conducted to investigate the possible existence of a contagion effect between Japan and 
the crisis countries.  Our results (not reported) show that the impact of the Asian crisis on Japan is not as 
dramatic as events such as the 1990 Gulf War or the September 11, 2001 attacks.  Starting from early 1998, 
the correlation coefficients rise gradually and reach a high value of around 0.25 during the Russia crisis and 
the near-default of the U.S. hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) in the global stock 
markets.  Our evidence is consistent with the findings of Arestis et al. (2003) that contagion from the Asian 
crisis countries to Japan took place in early 1998.  The contagion from the Asian-crisis countries to Japan 
was relatively slow and moderate as compared with other events or factors.   
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broken lines show FR’s heteroskedasticity-adjusted correlation (AB and CD) for the 
Thailand-HK pair from January 1, 1996, to November 16, 1997, using October 17, 1997 
as a breakpoint for defining stable and turmoil periods. 28  Two observations are 
immediately apparent by comparing two estimates.  First, the constant correlation model 
fails to reveal the time-varying feature and, hence, is unable to reflect the dynamic market 
conditions.  Second, the estimated coefficient for the constant correlation model, even 
with an adjustment for heteroskedasticity, is conditional on the sample size of the regime 
or the length of the window for calculating.  For instance, by estimating the correlation 
coefficients based on FR’s sample periods, we obtain the estimated values of 0.098 and 
0.042 for the stable period (line AB) and the turmoil period (line CD), respectively.  By 
extending the turmoil period to a longer sample period, as we have done in this paper, the 
correlation coefficient jumps up to 0.244, as shown in a broken line EF in Figure 3.   
Thus, our finding is consistent with FR’s analysis if a longer sample period is included.  
However, the dynamic correlation coefficient is able to capture the dynamic elements 
continually emerging from the market.  
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
 
5.4 The Effect of Sovereign Credit-Rating Changes on Correlation Coefficients 
                                                 
28 Constant correlation coefficients are estimated using the following basic VAR model in FR (2002): 
 ttt XLX ηφ += )(    
  }',{ jt
c
tt xxX =
where  is the two-day average stock market return in Hong Kong (crisis country),  is the two-day 
average stock return in another country, 
c
tx
j
tx
)(Lφ  is a 2x2 matrix of lag L, and tη  is a vector of disturbance 
terms. As in FR’s paper, L = 5. This is the same specification as the fifth to last row in  Table V in FR’s 
paper (2002).  We also estimate and compare our model with that of FR by varying lags and return 
definition;  no significant difference is found.  Our paper differs from FR’s in two aspects. First, a longer 
sample is used to satisfy large sample properties.  Second, time-varying coefficients are derived based on 
the DCC-GARCH(1,1) model. A detailed report of the estimated results is available from the authors 
upon request.  
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 It should be noted that the noise of the correlation coefficients in equation (8) might 
be sensitive to news, local or global.  The news that received substantial attention from 
policy makers and investors during the 1997 Asian financial crisis included the 
announcements of changes in foreign-currency sovereign credit ratings for a particular 
country in the region.  To incorporate this information into the model, equation (8) is 
rewritten as:   
   (10) ,,
)(
,
1
1
2
)(
,
1
1
1
3
1
,1,10, tij
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stj
s
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s
s
k
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where  is an indicator (intervention) variable for measuring the impulse effect of  
news that reaches the market at time t = T.  In this context, and  are used to 
capture the effect of sovereign credit-rating changes in its own country i and a foreign 
country j with a window length of s, spanning from (T-1) to (T+1); 
)( sT
tI
)(
,
sT
tiI
)(
,
sT
tjI
s1ω and s2ω are 
constant coefficients.  The sovereign credit-rating changes can take place in market i, 
Thailand, and/or in market j, comprised of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines,  Korea, 
and Hong Kong. 
 The indicator variable for s = -1, 0, and 1 takes the form of: 
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where denotes changes in the sovereign credit ratings and outlooks reported by  
Standard and Poor’s.  For instance, for an upgrade of one notch, we set  = 1; for a 
downgrade of 2, we set  = -2.  If there is an outlook change from positive to stable or 
from stable to negative, the rating is changed by –1/3.  If an outlook changes from 
positive to negative, then the rating is changed by -2/3.  The binary settings for , 
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which reflect rating changes and/or “outlook changes” and the on-watch or  off-watch list 
of markets under investigation, are summarized in the Appendix.29  
 To provide an illustration of the influence of news about sovereign credit-rating 
changes in its own and foreign countries on cross-country correlation coefficients, we 
estimate equation (10) for Thailand as country i and Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Korea, or Hong Kong as country j.  The estimation results of equation (10) and equation 
(9) are reported in Table 5.  The evidence shows that all of the markets are negatively 
influenced by the sovereign credit-rating changes in Thailand; the coefficients for 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Korea as a foreign country are all statistically 
significant with a one-day lag.  However, a positive significant effect is found in Indonesia 
and Hong Kong markets in the contemporaneous term.30  With respect to the impact of 
foreign rating changes on correlations, the statistics indicate that the coefficients on both 
Indonesia and Hong Kong are significant.  Putting the information together suggests that 
investors in Indonesia and Hong Kong markets have more significant and sensitive 
responses to the announcements of rating changes, domestic and foreign.  The joint tests 
based on the F-statistics (FR ) also find strong supporting evidence of the significant 
effect of sovereign credit-rating changes, domestic and foreign, on cross-country 
                                                 
29  We construct a similar indicator variable for measuring exchange-rate intervention.  There is no 
significant   effect  on the indicator.  For this reason, we do not report the results.  
 
30 It is a rather complex job to determine the sign of sovereign credit ratings on the correlation coefficient. 
One possible reason is the different speeds  in reacting to announcements.  For instance, if stock returns 
in both Thailand and Hong Kong  react instantaneously to rating changes, but with different speeds, the 
pair-wise correlation coefficient is likely to decline.  Thus, a negative news announcement is seen to be 
positively related to the correlation coefficient.  On the other hand, if stock returns in the Philippines 
covary with those  of Thailand with the same speed, the correlation coefficient will be positive; an 
announcement of bad news on the rating change will have a negative effect on the correlation coefficient.  
The sign will be more uncertain if information lags received by respective agents occur. This can be 
more difficult if agents have a limited ability to corroborate government data to form investment or 
sovereign credit-rating decisions. Moreover, the rating reflects mainly political risk and economic 
fundamentals, while the correlation coefficient variations can also be affected by market momentum. 
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correlation coefficients of stock returns. Further checking the Lung-Box Q statistic and 
the ARCH test finds that with some minor exceptions the serial correlations in both the 
error and error-squared series are considered “adequate.”   
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 In conclusion, empirical analysis of the correlation coefficients suggests that in 
addition to structural changes appearing at different phases of the crisis, news about 
sovereign credit-rating changes in its own and foreign countries has a significant impact 
on pair-wise cross-country stock return correlations between the Asian markets around 
announcement dates. The evidence is in line with the intervention analysis in time series 
of stock-return correlations, while market participants and credit-rating agents both play  
dynamic roles in shaping the cross-country correlation coefficients of stock returns in the 
Asian countries.  
6.  Conclusions 
This paper investigates the relationship between the stock returns of various crisis-hit 
countries during the 1997-98 Asian financial crises.  Heteroskedasticity-adjusted simple 
correlation analysis with an extended length of window as well as dynamic correlation 
analysis concludes that there is evidence of contagion effects during the Asian financial 
crisis, a finding that does  not  agree with the “no contagion” conclusion reached by Forbes 
and Rigobon (2002).  
While examining stock-market contagion and herding behavior, we apply a dynamic 
multivariate GARCH model to analyze daily stock-return data in the Asian market during 
the 1996 to 2003 period.  This study identifies two phases of the Asian crisis. In the first 
phase, the crisis displays a process of increasing correlations, while in the second phase, 
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investor behavior converges and correlations are significantly higher across the Asian 
countries in the sample.  One possible explanation is that the contagion effect takes place 
early in the crisis and that herding behavior dominates the latter stages of the crisis.  
 The apparent high correlation coefficients during crisis periods implies that the gain 
from international diversification by holding a portfolio consisting of diverse stocks from 
these contagion countries declines, since these stock markets are commonly exposed to  
systematic risk.  Moreover, the high volatility of correlation coefficients implies the 
presence of either an unstable covariance or an erratic variance, or both.  The uncertainty 
of the estimated coefficients thus provides less reliable statistical inferences, which may 
misguide portfolio decisions. 
An important finding emerging from our investigation of the dynamic behavior of 
stock-return correlations is that the cross-country correlation structure of stock returns is 
subject to structural changes, both in level and in variability. The correlation coefficients 
are found to be significantly influenced by news about changes in foreign-currency 
sovereign credit ratings in its own and foreign countries.  This study suggests that both 
investors and international rating agents play significant roles in shaping the structure of 
dynamic correlations in the Asian markets.    
  
 26
Acknowledgements   
 We thank the co-editor, Michael Melvin, and an anonymous referee for valuable 
comments on a previous version, although we alone are responsible for any errors that 
may remain. The paper was presented at the 2005 ASSA meeting in Philadelphia.  
Thomas C. Chiang would like to acknowledge the research support received from the 
Marshall M. Austin fund, LeBow Business College, Drexel University. 
 
 27
Appendix 
 
 The information about changes in foreign-currency sovereign credit ratings for five Asian 
crisis countries during the period from July 1, 1997, to December 31, 1998, is obtained from 
Standard and Poor’s CreditWeek. Long-term foreign-currency sovereign credit ratings represent a 
country’s likelihood of defaulting on foreign-currency-denominated sovereign bonds.  The rating 
scales of the Standard and Poor’s ratings are as follows.  The highest band is “A,” which has 
seven notches: AAA, AA+, AA, AA-, A+, A, A-.  The next band is the “B” level rating, which 
has nine notches: BBB+, BBB, BBB-, BB+, BB, BB-, B+, B, B-.  The lowest band has six 
notches: CCC+, CCC, CCC-, CC, SD (selective default) and D. Outlook changes and the on-
watch or  off-watch list are also included in our study, since they may have the same information 
content as rating changes.  There are three outlook scales: positive, stable, and negative.  The on-
watch or  off-watch list is treated the same as outlook changes.  In order to use these ratings, 
numerical values are attached.  Since there are a total of 22 notches, where the lowest rating never 
shows up in the sample, the highest rating AAA is assigned 20 and the SD is assigned 0.  A 
negative outlook will add nothing to the value, while stable and positive outlooks add 1/3 and 2/3 
to the rating values, respectively.  The rating changes are summarized in the following table.   
 
[Insert Table A1 about here] 
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Table A1.  The Intervention Variable for Rating Changes (07/01/1997 - 12/31/1998) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Thailand   = -1/3 (Ts: August 1, 1997), = -1 (Ts: September 3, 1997; January 8, 1998), = -2 
(Ts: October 24, 1997), otherwise =0. 
)( sT
iI
Indonesia   = -1 (Ts: October 10, 1997; January 9, 1998; January 27; March 11, 1998; May 
15, 1998), = -4/3 (Ts: December 31, 1997), = -3 (Ts: January 27, 1998), 
otherwise =0; 
)( sT
jI
   Malaysia = -1 /3 (Ts: August 18, 1997; September 25, 1997), = -1 (Ts: December 23, 1997),  
  = -4/3 (Ts: April 17, 1998; July 24, 1998), = -2 (Ts: September 15, 1998),  
  otherwise =0;   
)( sT
jI
   Philippines = -1/3 (Ts: September 25, 1997; February 23, 1998), otherwise =0;  )( sTjI
Korea   = -1 /3 (Ts: August 6, 1997), = -1 (Ts: October 24, 1997), = -2 (Ts: November 25,  
         1997), = -3 (Ts: December 11, 1997), = -4 (Ts: December 22, 1997), = 1/3 (Ts:  
          January 16, 1998), = 3 (Ts: February 17, 1998), otherwise =0.  
)( sT
jI
 
Hong Kong =  -1 /3 (Ts: December 4, 1992; June 12, 1998), = - 2/3 (Ts: February 12, 1990),  
 -1 (Ts: August 31, 1998), = 1/3 (Ts: December 7, 1999), = 2/3 (Ts: February 13, 
 1995; May 14, 1997), = 1 (Ts: February 8, 2001), otherwise =0. 
)( sT
jI
________________________________________________________________________ 
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Figure 1. Daily Stock Returns (1/1/1990-3/21/2003) 
HK, IN, JP, KO, MA, PH, SG, US, TH, and TW, respectively,  represent the stock returns of Hong Kong, 
Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, the U.S., Thailand, and Taiwan. All stock 
returns are 100 times first differences of natural logarithms of the stock indices.
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Figure 2. GARCH-corrected correlations between the stock returns of Thailand and those 
of the other five crisis countries (1996-2003) 
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Figure 3. Dynamic and constant correlation coefficients of the stock returns between 
Thailand and Hong Kong (1996-2003) 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics on Stock Returns (1/1/1990-3/21/2003) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 Mean Variance Skewness Kurtosis LB(16) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Panel A: Before the crisis 
 
HK 0.086   1.765  -0.512***     5.017***      25.856* 
Indonesia 0.031 0.984 1.500*** 19.141*** 285.714*** 
Japan -0.034 2.093 0.423*** 5.098*** 31.772** 
Korea -0.009 1.965 0.255*** 2.799*** 15.695 
Malaysia 0.037 1.517 -0.045 8.906*** 91.287*** 
Philippines 0.048 2.273 0.052 4.001*** 134.326*** 
Singapore 0.026 1.009 -0.396*** 6.308*** 102.874*** 
Taiwan -0.003 4.592 -0.076 3.493*** 39.952*** 
Thailand -0.026 2.741 -0.247*** 5.294*** 54.835*** 
US 0.047 0.535 -0.165*** 2.249*** 28.813** 
 
Panel B:  After the crisis 
      
HK  -0.034   4.112    0.219***    8.524***    37.392*** 
Indonesia -0.041 4.182 0.169*** 5.973*** 81.438*** 
Japan -0.060 2.474 0.099 1.864*** 15.741 
Korea -0.018 6.611 -0.050 1.949*** 24.175* 
Malaysia -0.045 4.030 0.696*** 22.882*** 61.591*** 
Philippines -0.067 3.020 1.009*** 12.308*** 76.848*** 
Singapore -0.025 2.818 0.419*** 8.241*** 50.762*** 
Taiwan -0.045 3.329 0.054 1.755*** 32.718*** 
Thailand -0.025 4.153 0.622*** 3.751*** 64.678*** 
US 0.0004 1.808 -0.025 2.148*** 15.801 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Notes: Observations for all series in the whole sample period are 3449. The observations for the pre-crisis 
and post-crisis sub-periods are 1956 and 1493, respectively.  ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 
the  1%, 5% and 10% levels,  respectively.  All variables are first differences of the natural log of stock 
indices times 100.b LB(16) refers to Ljung Box statistics with a 16-day lag. 
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Table 2A  
Test of significant increases in correlation coefficients (Thailand and Hong Kong as the 
source of contagion, respectively) 
 Correlation Correlation Adj. Correlation Z-Stat Z-stat
 before crisis after crisis after crisis (Unadjusted) (Adjusted)
Thailand as the source:
TH-HK 0.310 0.372 0.310 -2.041** 0.012
      TH-IN 0.158 0.341 0.283 -5.695*** -3.817***
      TH-JP 0.148 0.229 0.188 -2.443*** -1.189
      TH-KO 0.141 0.311 0.257 -5.224*** -3.515***
      TH-PH 0.211 0.314 0.260 -3.220*** -1.494*
      TH-SG 0.391 0.454 0.383 -2.231** 0.290
TH-TW 0.141 0.206 0.169 -1.949** -0.822
Hong Kong as the source:  
HK-TH 0.286 0.398 0.278 -3.702*** 0.245
HK-PH 0.211 0.354 0.245 -4.524*** -1.035
      HK-IN 0.203 0.334 0.230 -4.094*** -0.813
      HK-SG 0.512 0.650 0.496 -6.114*** 0.629
HK-TW 0.139 0.272 0.185 -4.032*** -1.371*
      HK-JP 0.254 0.437 0.308 -6.069*** -1.719**
HK-KO 0.084 0.361 0.250 -8.553*** -4.990***
Notes: HK, IN, JP, KO, PH, SG, TH, and TW represent the stock returns of Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, 
Korea, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Taiwan, respectively.   
Adjustment of the correlation is given in equation (1).  Z-tests are given in Footnote (9). The null 
hypothesis is no increase in correlation. The 1%, 5%, and 10% critical values for a one-sided test of the null 
are  –2.32, -1.64, and –1.28, respectively.   ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively.  Malaysia is not included due to a decrease in correlation after the crisis.  
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Table 2B 
Test of significant increases in simple correlation coefficients 
 Correlation Correlation Adj. Correlation Z-Stat Z-stat
 before crisis after crisis after crisis (Unadjusted) (Adjusted)
TH-HK 0.310 0.372 0.310 -2.041** 0.012 
  TH-IN 0.158 0.341 0.283 -5.695*** -3.817*** 
  TH-JP 0.148 0.229 0.188 -2.443*** -1.189 
TH-KO 0.141 0.311 0.257 -5.224*** -3.515*** 
  TH-PH 0.211 0.314 0.260 -3.220*** -1.494* 
  TH-SG 0.391 0.454 0.383 -2.231** 0.290 
TH-TW 0.141 0.206 0.169 -1.949** -0.822 
PH-HK 0.200 0.351 0.309 -4.763*** -3.402*** 
   PH-IN 0.188 0.312 0.274 -3.852*** -2.644*** 
PH-JP 0.082 0.183 0.159 -2.992*** -2.286** 
 PH-KO 0.053 0.215 0.188 -4.807*** -3.977*** 
PH-SG 0.266 0.407 0.361 -4.636*** -3.053*** 
PH-TW 0.139 0.146 0.127 -0.208 0.355 
MA-IN 0.208 0.262 0.164 -1.662*** 1.316 
 MA-KO 0.108 0.215 0.134 -3.197*** -0.763 
 MA-TW 0.142 0.171 0.106 -0.864 1.066 
IN-HK 0.172 0.339 0.172 -5.211*** -0.007 
   IN-JP 0.060 0.198 0.098 -4.087*** -1.098 
IN-KO 0.015 0.184 0.090 -4.975*** -2.201** 
IN-SG 0.222 0.404 0.210 -5.892*** 0.380 
IN-TW 0.043 0.155 0.076 -3.292*** -0.960 
SG-HK 0.504 0.649 0.455 -6.364*** 1.861 
   SG-JP 0.319 0.375 0.235 -1.852** 2.638 
SG-KO 0.133 0.356 0.222 -6.934*** -2.683*** 
SG-TW 0.174 0.284 0.175 -3.379*** -0.017 
TW-HK 0.141 0.267 0.309 -3.828*** -5.174*** 
  TW-JP 0.143 0.218 0.254 -2.255** -3.357*** 
TW-KO 0.094 0.260 0.302 -4.995*** -6.307*** 
  HK-JP 0.251 0.433 0.300 -6.021*** -1.550* 
HK-KO 0.077 0.355 0.241 -8.547*** -4.918*** 
  KO-JP 0.047 0.317 0.092 -8.177*** -1.326* 
Notes: See notes in Table 2A. For the cases displaying a decrease in correlation, pair-wise correlations 
between the stock returns in Malaysia and those in Thailand, the Philippines, Hong Kong, Japan, and 
Singapore will not be reported.   
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Table 3 
Estimation results from the GARCH-DCC model 
 
 Return Equations Variance Equations 
 0γ  1γ  2γ  c  a  b  Persistence 
TH 0.0448* 0.057*** 0.228*** 0.0615*** 0.878*** 0.109*** 0.987 
 (1.756) (4.173) (8.733) (4.979) (88.771) (12.057)  
IN 0.0162 0.218*** 0.155*** 0.0137*** 0.894*** 0.117*** 1.011 
 (0.972) (15.163) (8.778) (4.333) (131.86) (13.279)  
MA 0.0551*** 0.129*** 0.218*** 0.0256*** 0.892*** 0.099*** 0.991 
 (3.224) (9.856) (14.090) (5.817) (117.59) (13.084)  
KO 0.0145 0.001 0.324*** 0.0454*** 0.908*** 0.082*** 0.990 
 (0.498) (0.036) (12.374) (4.165) (79.678) (8.038)  
HK 0.0885*** -0.030*** 0.474*** 0.0363*** 0.926*** 0.058*** 0.984 
 (4.532) (-2.568) (23.344) (6.018) (160.23) (13.712)  
JP -0.0005 -0.046*** 0.360*** 0.0488*** 0.899*** 0.0798*** 0.978 
 (-0.023) (-3.294) (18.270) (7.457) (123.41) (13.332)  
PH 0.0289 0.157*** 0.282*** 0.0582*** 0.889*** 0.0948*** 0.983 
 (1.165) (10.703) (11.773) (5.359) (97.069) (11.975)  
SG 0.0457*** 0.049*** 0.330*** 0.0316*** 0.910*** 0.071*** 0.981 
 (3.301) (4.073) (18.451) (5.219) (85.734) (8.789)  
TW 0.0337 0.015 0.264*** 0.0607*** 0.917*** 0.066*** 0.983 
 (1.124) (1.183) (9.090) (5.601) (105.89) (9.545)  
US 0.0559*** 0.015  0.0047*** 0.943*** 0.055*** 0.998 
 (3.568) (0.979)  (3.434) (151.25) (8.624)  
Notes: See Notes in Table 2A. U.S. represents U.S. stock returns. The estimates of the mean-reverting 
process are α =0.006 (7.278) and β =0.989 (480.292).  The persistence level of the variance is calculated 
as the summation of the coefficients in the variance equations (a+b).  The t-statistics are in parentheses.   
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels with critical values of 2.58, 1.96, 
and 1.65, respectively.   
Return equations: ,         
 where , 
t
US
ttt RRR εγγγ +++= −− 12110
)',,, ,10,2 ttt RR L ,,( ,2,1 ttt( ,1t RR = )', ,10 tεεεε L= , ),0(~| 1 ttt HNI −ε . 
Variance equations:        i =1, 2, …, 10     2 1,1,, −− ++= tiitiiiitii bhach ε
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Table 4 
Tests of changes in dynamic correlations between national stock returns during different 
phases of the Asian crisis (1/1/1990-3/21/2003) 
   Indonesia      Malaysia Philippines     Korea Hong Kong 
Mean Equation      
Constant 0.0012*** 0.0006*** 0.0007*** 0.0015*** 0.0011*** 
 (3.563) (3.376) (3.506) (5.789) (3.866) 
1−tρ  0.9947*** 0.9965*** 0.9958*** 0.9906*** 0.9951*** 
 (617.596) (1644.042) (987.179) (629.207) (969.677) 
tDM ,1  0.0011 -6.39E-06 0.0009 -5.31E-05 -0.0004 
 (0.988) (-0.006) (1.382) (-0.094) (-0.380) 
tDM ,2  0.0007* 0.0007*** 0.0007* 0.0011*** 0.0014*** 
 (1.650) (2.750) (1.801) (2.794) (4.506) 
tDM ,3  -0.0002 0.0002 1.61E-05 0.0005*** 0.0003** 
 (-0.998) (1.531) (0.151) (2.742) (2.021) 
Variance Equation      
Constant 8.98E-06*** 4.77E-06*** 2.29E-06*** 1.14E-06*** 1.18E-05*** 
 (38.033) (28.293) (38.054) (26.551) (62.028) 
2
1−tε  0.3637*** 0.5425*** 0.3176*** 0.1440*** 0.7059*** 
 (22.312) (25.467) (36.454) (34.172) (41.709) 
1−th  0.3347*** 0.3816*** 0.7103*** 0.8274*** 0.0825*** 
 (21.654) (25.760) (144.773) (256.083) (7.093) 
tDM ,1  2.77E-05*** 2.96E-05*** 3.48E-06** 9.04E-07* 5.74E-05*** 
 (6.773) (7.825) (2.270) (1.699) (7.985) 
tDM ,2  1.87E-05*** 4.18E-06*** 1.21E-06*** 3.11E-06*** 1.68E-05*** 
 (12.632) (8.092) (2.827) (8.489) (10.699) 
tDM ,3  2.00E-06*** 2.88E-06** -8.18E-07*** 6.89E-07*** 1.45E-06*** 
 (12.032) (25.663) (-12.967) (10.321) (5.457) 
Q (5) 2.709 14.895* 8.201 1.311 8.296 
ARCH(5)  0.074 0.709 4.986 6.215 0.366 
Notes: Estimates are based on equation (8) and equation (9) in the text.  is the correlation coefficient 
between the stock returns of Thailand and the other five crisis countries of Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Korea, and Hong Kong.  is the dummy variable for the first phase of the crisis period 
(7/2/1997-11/17/1997);  is the dummy variable for the second phase of the Asian crisis (11/18/1997-
12/31/1998); and DM  is the dummy variable for the post-crisis period (1/1/1999-3/21/2003). The lag 
length k is determined by the AIC criterion.  Q(5) is the Ljung-Box Q-statistics up to 5 days, testing the serial 
correlation of the residuals.  ARCH(5) is the ARCH LM test up to 5 days, testing the heteroskedasticity of the 
residuals.   ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
Numbers in parentheses are Z-statistics. 
tij,ρ
tDM ,1
tDM ,2
t,3
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Table 5. Tests of the influence of news about sovereign credit-rating changes on across-country 
correlation coefficients between national stock returns (1/1/1990-3/21/2003) 
 Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Korea Hong Kong 
Mean Equation      
Constant 0.0012*** 0.0006*** 0.0014*** 0.0015*** 0.0011*** 
 (2.722) (3.299) (5.213) (5.792) (3.840) 
1−tρ  0.9944*** 0.9966*** 0.9932*** 0.9906*** 0.9950*** 
 (542.270) (1658.339) (757.926) (628.626) (964.470) 
tDM ,1  0.0006 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0009 
 (0.793) (-0.307) (-0.257) (-0.362) (-0.890) 
tDM ,2  0.0008* 0.0007*** 0.0009** 0.0011*** 0.0014*** 
 (1.612) (2.575) (2.246) (2.742) (4.651) 
tDM ,3  -0.0002 0.0002 -0.0002 0.0005*** 0.0003* 
 (-0.643) (1.567) (-1.635) (2.742) (1.891) 
1, +TiI  -0.0007 0.0030** -0.0003 -0.0031*** 0.0061*** 
 (-0.348) (2.461) (-0.290) (-2.971) (3.653) 
TiI ,  0.0056*** -0.0031 -0.0024 -0.0005 0.0096*** 
 (3.733) (-1.553) (-1.009) (-0.136) (6.156) 
1, −TiI  -0.0064*** -0.0045** -0.0049*** -0.0026** -0.0038 
 (-3.524) (-2.462) (-3.551) (-2.020) (-1.357) 
1, +TjI  -0.0008*** -0.0027 0.0006 0.0003 -0.0029 
 (-3.547) (-1.321) (0.221) (0.219) (-0.919) 
TjI ,  0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0012 -0.0013 0.0037*** 
 (0.430) (-0.074) (-0.109) (-0.938) (3.048) 
1, −TjI  -9.14E-05 -1.38E-05 -0.0002 0.0008 -0.0015 
 (-0.082) (-0.006) (-0.021) (0.373) (-0.550) 
Variance Equation      
Constant 1.42E-05*** 4.73E-06*** 2.41E-06*** 1.14E-06*** 1.24E-05*** 
 (29.796) (27.938) (34.234) (26.357) (71.745) 
2
1−tε  0.3339*** 0.5553*** 0.2662*** 0.1452*** 0.7212*** 
 (19.299) (24.640) (27.553) (34.098) (40.529) 
1−th  0.1824*** 0.3820*** 0.7099*** 0.8267*** 0.0497*** 
 (7.422) (25.253) (119.470) (254.793) (5.177) 
tDM ,1  2.01E-05*** 1.91E-05*** 3.62E-06** 6.77E-07 4.73E-05*** 
 (5.259) (5.417) (2.373) (1.161) (9.129) 
tDM ,2  2.29E-05*** 4.22E-06*** 1.90E-06*** 3.12E-06*** 1.75E-05*** 
 (11.913) (8.093) (3.682) (8.411) (10.520) 
tDM ,3  2.68E-07 2.96E-06*** -7.28E-07*** 6.89E-07*** 1.47E-06*** 
 (1.349) (25.670) (-10.443) (10.276) (5.391) 
RF  18.095*** 6.352*** 3.139*** 2.134** 14.926*** 
Q (5) 1.313 14.739** 8.204 1.299 10.231*
ARCH(5)  0.043 0.707 0.800 6.444 0.452 
Notes: See notes in Table 4.  Estimates are based on (9) and (10) in the text.  
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